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Shipping Regulation and the Federal
Maritime Commission
PART II
James S. Gordont
On June 27, 1969, the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia
affirmed the Federal Maritime Commission's decision in the NA UK
Investigation.23 The court's decision decided nothing other than that
the Commission's remedial orders did not exceed its very limited
authority over ratemaking in the foreign liner trades. The court did
not decide whether the Commission's interpretation of section 18(b)
(5)'s standards of "unreasonableness" and "detriment to commerce"
were correct; whether the burden of proof prestidigitation worked by
the Iron and Steel rule was fair, let alone lawful; or whether there was
sufficient evidence, or any at all, to support the Commission's statutory
findings. For the court, the dispositive and sole question was whether
the Commission's order, which required the carriers to "justify" their
new rates (to be filed in place of those "disapproved") in terms of cost,
value of service, and other traditional ratemaking factors, was an undue
interference with the carriers' congressionally approved system of rate-
making, as the conferences had argued. In reaching and then deciding
this issue in favor of the Commission, the court did not examine and
then reject the conferences' strenuous arguments on the foregoing
questions; it simply ignored them and assumed the issues which they
raised. Consequently, little, if anything, more is known of the probable
fate of the FMC's regulatory doctrine in the federal courts after, than
before, the NA UK appeal, and the possibility of thorough judicial re-
view of the procedures and legal rules which determined the NA UK
outcome is, at least temporarily, foreclosed. The Commission's NA UK
decision will doubtless join its Iron and Steel and Boilers antecedents
as hard and fast precedent for similar, if not more aggressive, direct
rate regulation in the "rate disparities" mold.
224
t Member of the Illinois Bar. This is the second installment of a two-part article. The
first part appeared in the Fall 1969 Issue, 37 U. Cni. L. REv. 90-158.
223 American Export-Isbrandtsen Lines, Inc. v. FMC, Docket No. 22,402 (D.C. Cir. 1969).
224 See, e.g., Speech of Commissioner G. H. Hearn before the Federal Bar Association,
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On a number of grounds, not the least of which is that the Commis-
sion's decision makes very questionable law, the inconclusive outcome
of the principal issues underlying the NA UK litigation is unfortunate.
It is dubious whether the findings of fact upon which the Commission's
final orders were based can withstand critical examination. It is far
from clear that the Commission's entire regulatory doctrine, even if
applied upon a proper record, is capable of producing rational results.
It is not possible to reconcile the Commission's view of its regulatory
powers under section 18(b)(5) with the fundamental regulatory scheme
of the Shipping Act of 1916. Here, we shall take up the first two subjects,
in the order given, leaving the third for discussion in a subsequent sec-
tion of this article.
Viewed even in the extremely restrictive context of the rate dispari-
ties rule,2 25 there are substantial reasons to doubt that an adequate
prima facie case was made against the NAUK Conference rates which
the Commission disapproved. It is dubious that the NAUK trades in-
bound and outbound were comparable inter se or with the Canada/
United Kingdom and North Atlantic Continent trades in any meaning-
ful sense, in view of the very significant differences as between these
trades in the identity of the carrier participants and their primary
interests, 226 in the degree of competition facing the different conferences
Sept. 4, 1969, FMC News Release Sp 69-12, and Speech of Dep. Sol. H. B. Mutter before the
National Customshouse Brokers and Forwarders Assoc., Sept. 30, 1969, FMC News Release
Sp 69-18. At this writing, the Commission's staff is currently engaged in preparations for
a similar investigation of the outbound trade between North Atlantic and Gulf ports
and the Far East.
225 For the wording of this rule, see text at notes 180-1 supra. The basic doctrine
is that rates may be deemed "so unreasonably high ... as to be detrimental to the com-
merce of the United States" exclusively on the basis of unfavorable rate comparisons
coupled with the testimony of shippers that they would ship more under a lower freight
rate-the latter testimony being characterized as "evidence" that movement of goods under
the higher rate has been "impaired." See, e.g., the testimony of the meatpackers, text at
note 213 supra. An unfavorable rate comparison plus such testimony gives rise to a
presumption of unreasonableness, which, if not rebutted, will support a Commission ruling
under section 18(b)(5), disapproving the rate(s) in question.
226 Two members of the NAUK (outbound) Conference did not belong to the NAWFA
(inbound) Conference, and six members of the NAWFA did not belong to NAUK.
Carriers operating as independents in the reciprocal trade--or not serving it at all-do
not have an identity of interests with carriers serving both trades and belonging to both
inbound and outbound conferences. Excellent examples are the powerful German and
Scandinavian-flag carriers which belonged only to NAWFA and did not in the 1965-68
period serve the NAUK trade. As Continental carriers serving England en route to the
United States only to top off cargoes, and being accustomed to the stiffer competition in
the Continental liner markets, their interests conflicted more often than not with the
English-flag lines, which did not then serve the Continent at all and derived all their
business in their home market. The impact of such divergent identities and interests was
heightened by the unanimous voting rules of the NAUK Conference and the NAWFA
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serving each trade,227 in geographic market coverage,22s and in the
elasticity of demand for conference liner services of the shippers affected
by the different rates compared.229 These were very wide divergences,
and given their existence, and given the well known fact that competi-
tion and the relative elasticity of demand of shippers are prime deter-
minants of rate levels, rate comparisons were inevitably destined to
produce disparities-indeed, the discovery of identical rate levels as
between these trades would have been truly startling. There is, conse-
quently, no rational basis whatsoever for permitting a showing of the
which rendered concerted ratemaking between inbound and outbound conference for
strictly nationalistic or discriminatory purposes next to impossible. To say the least,
there is an even more striking divergence of membership lists and carrier interests as
between the NAUK, Canada/UK and North Atlantic Continental Freight Conferences,
and the Commission's attempt to treat the carriers serving these trades as identical (NAUK
Investigation at 33) and to compare rate levels as between these trades is even less
satisfactory.
227 See text accompanying notes 282-7 infra.
228 The NAWFA fixes rates for the South Atlantic ports, which many, although not
ai, of its members serve; the NAUK Conference jurisdiction excludes the South
Atlantic range and a small minority, if any, of its members actually serve the South
Atlantic ports on the same services scheduled regularly from North Atlantic ports.
Obviously, this difference in the geography actually covered by specific services of their
respective members implies that, as between the inbound and outbound conferences,
ports served, cargo mix, and cargo-related as well as vessel voyage operating expenses were
significantly different for a number of important carriers. Accordingly, the overall cost
and revenue profiles of the outbound and inbound trades were different enough to
account for different ratemaking policies as between the outbound and inbound con-
ferences. While the impact of these differences and the divergent interests which they
engender is nonquantifiable, it poses problems similar to those discussed in note 226 supra
and difficulties for the Commission's regulatory doctrine which cannot be dodged by
merely excluding from the cargo and revenue data furnished by the NAWFA the tonnage
and receipts clearly allocable to South Atlantic business. This was all the examiner did,
Init. Dec., supra note 194, at 28, on the ground that the differences described in this
note, irrespective of their impact, must be ignored because "regulation by means of rate
comparisons would be completely frustrated if the carriers could avoid all control by
merely constructing their tariffs and conducting their operations on differing bases."
Id. at 29. Besides admitting the bankruptcy of the method of regulation upon which
he was relying, the examiner is obviously begging the crucial question: whether rate
comparisons, given these marked differences, make any sense whatsoever. The Commission
is equally guilty; however, it simply ignored the problem altogether, after excluding the
NAWFA's inbound carryings to South Atlantic ports "from the comparisons because the
outbound conference covers only the North Atlantic ports." NAUK Investigation at 8 n.3.
229 To the extent that a shipper's elasticity of demand is determined by the ease with
which he can substitute independent for conference service, this conclusion is buttressed
by the FMC's and the Canadian Commission's findings summarized on pages 283-4
If they are accurate, it is obvious that inbound shippers have a greater ability to substitute
competing liner services against the NAWFA Conference members than do shippers in
the outbound trade against the NAUK Conference. Similarly, Canadian shippers are
relatively better off in this regard than their NAUK counterparts.
[Vol. 37:256
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existence of these disparities, without more, to establish a presumption
of "unreasonableness" against any one of the several rates compared.230
Similarly, there is strong reason to doubt whether any detriment to
commerce (or "impairment of movement") was ever established. The
most extraordinarily self-serving shipper testimony was accepted at face
value despite the total absence of hard data. No scientific effort was
ever made to determine whether there was any cause and effect relation-
ship between relatively high rate levels and a shipper witness' complaint
that he was unable to export as muchas he thought he might under a
lower rate. No evidence of the elasticity of demand for the goods in
question relative to their price in the English market was ever intro-
duced. Nor was there even any data regarding the level of landed price
competition in the English market. Even the "expert witnesses" called
on behalf of the government were able to say no more than that lower-
ing freight rates would increase exports, "all other things being
equal." 231 But, the conferences introduced substantial evidence that
"all other things" were far from being equal, in that a half-dozen or
more other barriers to increased exports to England of the goods in
question 2 2 were of far greater importance than freight rates in inhibit-
230 Indeed, until it formulated its Iron and Steel rule, the Commission and its
predecessors had consistently refused to permit a mere showing of lower rates for the
carriage of similar cargoes in reciprocal or other allegedly comparable trades--even in
trades in which voyage costs were higher because distance was greater-to support, without
more, a presumption of unreasonableness such as that which determined the results of
the NAUK Investigation. Edmond Weil, Inc. v. Italian Line "Italia," supra note 121, at
395, 396: "The mere fact that the rate in the reverse direction is substantially lower does
not justify a finding that the rate under attack is unreasonable or in any other way
detrimental to our commerce." Id. at 399. See also California Packing Corp. v. States S.S.
Co., 1 U.S.S.B. 546, 548 (1936); Philadelphia Ocean Traffic Bureau v. Export S.S. Corp.,
I U.S.S.B. 538, 541 (1936); Puerto Rican Rates, 2 U.S.M.C. 117, 119, 124 (1939); Alaska
Livestock & Trading Co. v. Aleutian Marine Transport Co., 7 F.M.C. 387 (1962); Thatcher
Glass Mfg. Co. v. Sea-Land Service, Inc., 8 F.M.C. 645, 649 (1965). These cases provide
unqualified support for the proposition that the significant differences rehearsed in the
preceding text and accompanying notes between the NAUK trade and those with which
it was compared should have invalidated all rate comparisons between them. And since
none of the inbound NAWFA, outbound Canada/UK or North Atlantic Continental rates
were themselves demonstrably "reasonable" on the record, it is surely remarkable that the
Commission's 18(b)(5) findings based, as they were, on nothing more than such rate
comparisons, survived judicial scrutiny. Cf. Note, Rate Regulation in Ocean Shipping, 78
HARv. L. Rv. 635, 649 (1965); D. LocKuN, ECONOMICS OF TRANSPORTATION, 408-9, 436
(6th ed. 1966).
231 This testimony was characterized by the hearing examiner as "an economic fact"
which had been established by "the overwhelming weight of the credible and persuasive
testimony of the economic experts." Init. Dec., supra note 194, at 45. Of course, these
experts failed to predict whether the rates would have to be lowered 50, 75 or 100 per
cent to achieve the desired effect.
232 Among these barriers to increased exports were "the high markup on imported
1970]
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ing cargo movement-evidence which was never even challenged. The
hearing examiner merely held this evidence insufficient to negate the in-
ference that freight rate levels might not also be of some importance,2 33
and with the exception of its unconvincing discussion of toys, the Com-
mission simply ignored this evidence altogether.234 Having done so, it
was easy for the Commission confidently to second-guess the judgment
of the carriers and enter "findings" that it was the relatively high level
of the freight rate on the commodities concerned which was impairing
the nation's exports and thus the carryings and revenues of the confer-
ence lines. There is nothing in the hearing examiner's or the Commis-
sion's opinions, however, which invites confidence in this conclusion.
We might well devote many pages at this point to a more comprehen-
sive review of the evidence supporting the critical views expressed above.
Also, inconsistent, arbitrary, and curiously illogical findings and rulings
goods in the United Kingdom, high manufacturing costs in the United States, tariff duties
and Commonwealth preference duties [in favor of Canadian, Australian, etc. producers]
on imports in the United Kingdom .... " id. at 45, as well as the 10 per cent, across-the-
board surcharge slapped on by the Exchequer to dampen imports and strengthen the
British balance of payments.
233 The examiner's actual ruling was as follows: "This contention actually amounts to
no more than speculation, because the respondents did not adduce evidence that these
other factors were the sole cause of the decline in the movement of commodities." Id. at
45-46. The examiner's error here is related to a more fundamental error which he
shared with the Commission: the inability to perceive that these "other factors" (sum-
marized in the preceding note) may serve to make the demand for the American exports
in question, and thus for conference shipping capacity, relatively inelastic with respect
to freight rate levels.
234 The Commission's toys discussion illustrates each of the foregoing criticisms. The
FMC disapproved the NAUK Conference's toys rate of $35.50 per ton W/M [weight
(2240 lbs.) or measure (40 cu. ft. to the ton) whichever produces the greatest revenue]
because it was $15.00 higher than the rate applicable in the Canada/UK trade. It
reasoned as follows:
It is true, as respondents state, that other factors such as British import duty,
high mark-up in their stores, the 10 per cent British surcharge on imports, and
other factors make it difficult for the American toy exporter to compete. Our
costs are no higher than those in Canada, however, except for the Commonwealth
preference in import duties. Yet, the Canadians successfully export American toys
and some of our exporters ship out of Canada.
NAUK Investigation at 25. It is noteworthy that the NAUK record was silent as to the value
and composition of the "typical ton" of toys, if such a construct exists; consequently,
no one knows whether shippers from American ports and those from Canadian ports
(whether the latter are American or Canadian was never established) are exporting the
same kinds of goods and whether the C.I.F. price advantage of $15 per ton for the
latter gives them a meaningful price advantage in the English market. There was no
evidence in the record, and it is surely not intuitively obvious, that American and
Canadian manufacturing-and especially labor costs-are the same; and if Canadians are
indeed "successfully" exporting "American toys" while Americans themselves are not,
it would suggest that the Commonwealth preference in import duties rather than freight
rate differentials, might in itself explain the advantage of Canadian producers.
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are abundant,2 5 and it is easy and tempting to ferret out and criticize
them, for whatever the exercise may be worth. But this is not our
purpose; nor would it help much in evaluating the worth of the Com-
mission's regulatory doctrine. At most, we might convince ourselves
that the doctrine was sloppily administered and wrongly applied. In
contrast, there is far greater utility in proceeding under the assumption
that somewhere there may be a case in which the Commission's rules
may be given proper application. Thus, we shall take the Commission's
final interpretation, in its NA UK opinion, of the meaning of section
18(b)(5) as the definitive core of its regulatory doctrine-which, in fact,
it is clearly intended to be-and question whether this doctrine, when
and if above criticism in its application to particular facts, is even
remotely capable of producing a rational program of direct rate regula-
tion.
B. The Commission's Regulatory Doctrine
Without question, the Shipping Act contemplates that ocean liner
freight rates shall be fixed at whatever level the carriers choose, so long
as those carriers acting jointly do so pursuant to filed and approved
steamship conference agreements, and so long as all rates established
are appropriately filed with the Commission and do not violate the
statutory proscriptions against undue and unjust preferences and un-
reasonable discriminations. It is just as certain that the phrases, "so
unreasonably high or low" and "detrimental to the commerce of the
United States" which appear in section 18(b)(5) together define the
only rates which the Commission may disapprove under that section,
and thus are clearly intended to control the exercise of the regulatory
power which that section confers. Accordingly, the manner in which
the Commission has interpreted these two phrases has determined the
principal features of its regulatory doctrine as it has emerged to date.
1. Detriment to Commerce. In the NA UK decision, the Commission
attempted its first systematic examination of the meaning of the words,
"detriment to commerce," and concluded that that phrase meant noth-
ing more than "something harmful."' 3 That is, in the Commission's
view, Congress empowered it to disapprove any rate which is "so
unreasonably high or low" as to cause "something harmful" to compet-
ing carriers or to exporters or importers. Precisely what "something
235 E.g., compare the Commission's grounds for reversing the hearing examiner on
rates over $55 per ton, NA UK Investigation at 37, with its grounds for affirming him on
the General Cargo, N.O.S. rate, id. at 16-17, 38-39, and on onions, id. at 22-23, 41.
236 NAUK Investigation at 35.
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harmful" means is, to say the least, unclear, since the words include
everything and exclude nothing, even the case of the shipper exporting
at a profit sufficiently large, after insurance and freight expenses, to
encourage him to continue exporting significant tonnages over a sub-
stantial period of time.2 3 7 The course of development of this extra-
ordinarily non-definitive definition suggests that the Commission is
more than a little satisfied with the vagueness of its handiwork.
Initially the FMC attempted to establish some tangible, limiting cri-
teria for determining whether a particular rate level impaired cargo
movement. In Iron and Steel, its first 18(b)(5) decision, it stated that
before the rebuttable presumption of unreasonableness 3 8 would arise
against a rate, "the Commission . . . would still have the burden of
proving that ... tonnage is handicapped in moving because the rate
is too high."23 9 While this statement is certainly vague to the point of
vacuity respecting the requisite harmful effect on commerce (what a
wide spectrum of effects the word "handicapped" must coverl), it does
seem to require that a test of direct causality between rate level and
impairment of cargo movements be applied to the evidence. In addition,
Iron and Steel appeared to require that this evidence be significant or
substantial; for while the Commission noted a "few isolated instances"
in the record "where shippers stated they lost sales because of their
inability to secure a rate reduction from Conferences," it found this
evidence insufficient to support a conclusion that the "rates are un-
lawful."240 But these minimal criteria were quickly abandoned three
months later in the Boilers opinion, under circumstances which led
inevitably to their complete repudiation in the subsequent NA UK
decision.
The Boilers case was at best a very poor vehicle for the development
of standards for judging injury to exports caused by unreasonably high
freight rates. The record did not disclose that an exporter "ever lost a
sale to a foreign competitor because of higher rates applicable in the
United States foreign trades." 241 The very most that the sole witness in
the case, the manager of the American Boilers Manufacturers Associa-
tion, was willing to say under oath was as follows:
237 The meat offal, egg albumen, onion, and toys shippers whose commodities were
the subject of the Commission's ameliorative section 18(b)(5) orders in the NAUK
Investigation would all answer to this description. Meat offal movement, for example,
exceeded 3000 tons in 1965, NAUK Conference exhibit, supra note 210.
238 See note 225 supra, for the manner of application and operation of this presumption.
239 9 F.M.C. at 191.
240 Id. at 192.
241 9 F.M.C. at 444.
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Transportation is an integral direct cost in any evaluation.
And we feel that our margins of advantage are being reduced,
either artificially or by general development of some of those
competing countries, that we have to be extremely concerned
with any cost differential that is going to make our position
that much less desirable. And ocean freight rates is [sic] one
of our direct factors that we have to be concerned with.242
Quoting this testimony, and relying directly upon it, the Commission
inexplicably concluded that "it would appear that the record is ade-
quate to show some indirect harm to the exporter even if it is merely
a limitation of the profit that could be made from a sale." 243 Even more
inexplicably, and notwithstanding the clear language to the contrary
in its Iron and Steel opinion (upon which it purported to rely) the
Commission found this "indirect harm to the exporter" to be coter-
minous with the "detriment to commerce" which section 18(b)(5)
prohibited. In the future, it ruled, the higher of two rates compared
"can be considered to be harmful even if it merely constitutes a limita-
tion on the net profit" of the shipper.244
Obviously, this ruling substantially lightens, if not eliminates, the
evidentiary burden upon the opponents of a conference rate. As every
penny of ocean freight "constitutes a limitation on the net profit that
could be realized from a sale," in the sense that, if the cargo moved free
of charge, net profits to the shipper would always be greater, every
rate, even one under which very significant tonnages are moving daily,
is potentially illegal under section 18(b)(5).
But even this open-ended definition was apparently too restrictive of
the Commission's discretion, and when the NA UK record came before
it, the FMC was determined to loosen its evidentiary standards even
further. The NA UK respondents had argued that the "tonnage handi-
capped in moving" test of Iron and Steel, and the "limitation of net
profits" test of Boilers, vitiated the Commission's prior rulings going
back as far as 1935, that a rate detrimental to the commerce of the
United States must be one which prevented cargo from moving or
caused significant loss of sales to shippers.245 This was true, said the
242 Id. at 445.
243 Id. at 444.
244 Id. at 457.
245 The cases cited by the respondents were Edmond Well, Inc. v. Italian Line "Italia,"
supra note 121; Pacific Coast-River Plate Brazil Rates, 2 U.S.M.C. 28 (1939); Imposition of
Surcharge by the Far East Conference at Searsport, Maine, supra note 120; and Surcharge
at U.S. Atlantic and Gulf Ports, 10 F.M.C. 13 (1966).
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Commission, but not because these earlier cases were decided incor-
rectly; rather these standards were simply too restrictive.
[A] rate which prevents cargo from moving certainly is detri-
mental to commerce. But what of a more intangible economic
impact, the watering down of profits or the inability of a mer-
chant to enter in a market at all? An unreasonable rate which
causes either of these results is detrimental to U.S. commerce.
Many situations may arise in which some economic harm
other than "lost sales" is worked by a rate upon some aspect
of our commerce. Thus, we will not restrict the definition of
detriment to commerce to those rates which prevent a com-
modity from moving. Rather, we will define detriment as
something harmful, not limit it to "lost sales" or other rigid
formulas.246
Surely, with this statement, the Commission's policy is unambiguous.
No restrictions upon the definition, and thus the content, of the
"detriment to commerce" phrase of the statute will be tolerated, if
they might constrain or limit the Commission's discretion to intervene
in the ratemaking process for the purpose of export promotion or for
any other reason. As "something harmful" is an inherently contentless
decision-making criterion, detriment to commerce will henceforth be
whatever the Commission may choose to say it is in any given case.
But this is not all. One of the Commission's potentially most impor-
tant rulings in the NA UK case indicates that the requisite "something
harmful" need not even be presently in being, nor capable of perception
by the ordinary businessman, or for that matter, by anyone other than
"the experts." It will be recalled that the Commission disapproved the
NAUK Conference's General Cargo, N.O.S. rate on the ground that it
had a "tendency to inhibit exports," 247 which is to say that it had a
tendency to do "something harmful." This ruling was based exclusively
on testimony of "experts" who said little more than that the level of
the General Cargo, N.O.S. rate placed the shipper in an "unfavorable
position" in negotiating with the carriers, and was otherwise so
"psychologically forbidding and disturbing" to the shipper when he
wished to "try to convince the shipping conference that the $70.75
N.O.S. rate should be, say, a $40 commodity rate," that he "often"
decided not to export at all.248 Although the conferences cross-examined
these experts diligently, emphasizing the numerous cases wherein com-
modities formerly shipped under General Cargo, N.O.S. rates were
246 NAUK Investigation at 35.
247 Note 214 supra and accompanying text.
248 Text at note 216 supra.
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reclassified at lower rates after shipper-carrier negotiations, they were
never able to come to grips with, let alone rebut, such chimerical ev-
idence. Thus, if the Commission's findings of fact are read in conjunc-
tion with its interpretation of the meaning and content of the law, it
is clear that a rate may be held unreasonably high in a 18(b)(5) proceed-
ing although it has not actually caused something harmful. It need
only have a tendency to do so, and this tendency may be extrapolated
from psychological and other non-economic phenomena.
Certainly, the foregoing suggests that the Commission's removal of
any and all substantive content from the phrase "detriment to com-
merce" is deliberate. The more vague the standard the less the oppo-
nent of a particular rate level need prove in order to shift the burden
of proving the reasonableness of that rate level to the carriers. Similarly,
the less tangible the test of injury and the more attenuated the requisite
evidence of causation, the more discretion the Commission will have
to aid specific shippers, whether importers or exporters, possessing sig-
nificant political influence or any other virtue to which the Commission
may attach importance at any given moment. In short, the Commission
has entirely freed itself from one of the only two legislative restraints
on its section 18(b)(5) power.
2. The rate "so unreasonably high or low." Although the Iron and
Steel and Boilers decisions were purportedly based upon it, the "un-
reasonably high or low" language of section 18(b)(5) was not formally
defined until the Commission's NA UK opinion. Such a rate, the Com-
mission there stated, was
in general.., one which does not conform to the rate-making
factors of cost, value of service, or other transportation condi-
tions. In other words, an unreasonable rate is one that cannot
be justified by one or more of these factors. 249
This definition is clearly the product of the Commission's preoccupa-
tion with rate disparities. It emerges directly from the Iron and Steel
rule which sets up a rebuttable presumption of unreasonableness
against a rate and places upon the carriers the burden of
showing that the attendant transportation circumstances re-
quire that the rate be set at that level. Subjects of justification
may include myriad rate-making factors which might differ
between the inbound and outbound rates. These include com-
petition, volume of the movement, stowage, stevedoring costs,
and others.2
0
249 NAUK Investigation at 29.
250 9 F.M.C. at 191-2.
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Through this burden of proof manipulation, the Commission orig-
inally sought little more than an explanation for directional rate dis-
parities for the carriage of similar cargoes over the same ocean trade
route which would negate the inference of inter-carrier conspiracy to
discriminate against American exporters. 51 Although not originated
by them, the idea that disparities between rates over the same trade
route permits such an inference in cases wherein exports were declining
was popularized and literally forced upon the Commission by Senator
Paul Douglas, members of his joint Economic Committee staff, and
various spokesmen for influential shippers who should have, and prob-
ably did, know better.252 These individuals focussed on the assumed
similarities in cargo handling and voyage cost factors, excluding out-
right from consideration or down-playing such other ratemaking fac-
tors as shipper elasticity of demand for conference liner services and
the strength of non-conference liner competition, the primary deter-
minants of whatever disparities there are between the rates assessed for
the carriage of similar commodities over different routes. For them the
mere existence of inbound-outbound disparities between rates on com-
modities exports of which had declined could properly support an
inference that the carriers responsible were discriminating deliberately
against American exports, and this inference, in turn, could support a
presumption that the higher outbound rate was in violation of section
18(b)(5) unless proved otherwise. As we have seen,25 the Commission's
leadership was roundly castigated for its failure to adopt and act upon
this theory, and was ultimately replaced by a new chairman who was
prepared to espouse the Douglas viewpoint, as his own.
It was from this context that the Commission's regulatory doctrine,
and particularly the Iron and Steel rule, with its insistence that the car-
riers "justify" charging rates higher for outbound than for inbound
traffic, emerged. Given that the Commission's original and principal ob-
jective was to blunt congressional criticism that it was doing nothing to
eradicate conspiratorial or otherwise unjustifiable discriminations
against American exporters, its policy of forcing the conferences to "jus-
tify" their rates, when such disparities appeared, in terms of cost, value
of service, and other "attendant transportation circumstances" was if
nothing else entirely logical. Indeed, it might even have been capable of
uncovering and eradicating that very rare, if not unique, case in which
wholly irrational ratemaking or an inter-carrier conspiracy against
American exporters was in fact lurking in the shadows. But, as a doc-
251 Text at notes 195-6 supra.
252 See note 195 supra.
253 See text at note 168 supra.
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trine of direct rate regulation intended to police the reasonableness of
ocean liner rate levels for the purpose of export promotion-as in the
NA UK Investigation-or for any other reason, the Commission's inter-
pretation of the "unreasonably high or low" language of section 18(b)(5)
makes no sense whatsoever. Rate levels in ocean liner shipping, with its
tightly oligopolistic market structure and its largely cartelized price
setting, simply cannot be "justified" or proved "reasonable" in terms
of cost, value of service, and "attendant transportation circumstances"
such as the presence or absence of significant inter-carrier competition.
They may only be explained in these terms. For even if the carriers
were capable of adequately explaining or accounting for specific rate
levels in terms of their bargaining advantages over shippers or the
latter's bargaining advantage over them, the Commission lacks any
quantitative standards by which to measure the result, since it lacks
power to inquire into the reasonableness of the rate of return on carrier
investment.
It is important not to underrate the difficulties raised by the Com-
mission's ratemaking impotence. Two of them should be emphasized.
First, the FMC and its predecessors have on many occasions254 followed
the lead of the Interstate Commerce Commission in recognizing and
approving rate discrimination based on value of service (entirely non-
cost) considerations not only for the reason that it lacks power to impose
entirely cost-related ratemaking upon the industry, but also for other
reasons which have become dogma in the field of regulated industries.255
Rate discrimination in every trade and on every route has created
enormously complex tariffs which are constantly in the throes of change.
Consequently, there is much cross-subsidization of one cargo by another,
one shipper group of another. Without power over rate of return, ad-
justing the levels of cross-subsidizing is virtually impossible-especially
since it is not merely the lowest value cargoes which are subsidized but
also those which are most susceptible to raiding by tramps, air freight,
254 See Investigation of Overland and OCP Rates and Absorptions, supra note 128, and
the extensive citations therein.
255 One of the most concise, yet rich, summaries of these reasons appears in W. K.
JONES, CASES AND MATERIALS ON REGuLATED INDusrum 215 (1967):
It [value of service] means, in effect, taking advantage of a condition of expansible
traffic volume where the traffic will respond to rate reductions, the results being
the encouragement of the maximum utilization of the carrier's plant and
equipment, the distribution of the constant costs over a larger volume of tonnage,
and the attainment of a lower level of rates on all traffic, the high-rated as well as
the low-rated, than could be realized if differences in rates were limited solely
to the differences in cost of service.
The foregoing was excerpted from Interstate Commerce Commission, Bureau of Accounts,
Cost Finding and Valuation, Statement No. 4-54-Explanation of Rail Cost Finding Pro-
cedures and Principles Relating to the Use of Costs (1954); reissued as Statement No. 7-63
(1963).
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and even overland carriers, all of which the FMC is powerless to reg-
ulate. Secondly, Congress has passed a number of laws explicitly de-
signed indirectly to subsidize American-flag shipping by guaranteeing
government-principally foreign-aid-financed cargoes to American-
flag vessels. These flag-reservation laws inevitably decrease the elasticity
of demand of the exporters whose cargoes are subject to them, making
them the captives of the United States-flag carriers serving the routes
in question. The result is that the market power of the American-flag
carriers-and accordingly, their conference-is vastly increased and the
bargaining leverage of the shippers correspondingly decreased, if not
destroyed-a circumstance which might, nearly by itself, explain why
American capital goods exporters to the underdeveloped countries of
Africa, Asia, and Latin America pay significantly higher freight rates
than do their foreign competitors.256 Yet, if faced with this explanation,
offered frankly in an 18(b)(5) proceeding, the Commission is powerless
to fashion a remedy. The congressional policy of United States-flag
fleet promotion and the means chosen to implement it could not be,
respectively, more clear or effective; lacking the power to impose the
maximum rate ceilings which alone are capable of protecting the U.S.
exporter's interests under these government-created monopoly condi-
tions, the most the Commission can do is reach the occasional, blatant
case of unconscionable profiteering which requires for its success an
unjustifiable rate discrimination between shippers. But even here, the
courts have drastically limited the Commission's powers.257 We shall
256 See, e.g., the case of United States High-Pressure Boiler exporters to the under-
developed countries of South Asia and Latin America, text following note 261 infra.
257 See American Export-Isbrandtsen Lines, Inc. v. FMC, 409 F.2d 1258 (2nd Cir. 1969),
in which the court reversed the FMC's ruling that the North Atlantic Mediterranean
Freight Conference (read: American Export-Isbrandtsen Lines and Prudential Lines, the
only two American-flag members and the only conference members eligible to carry the
U.S. Government cargoes in question) had violated section 17's prohibition against unjust
discrimination between shippers, by charging the State Department $81.50 per ton and
the Department of Defense only $36.20 per ton for the carriage of household goods "to
the same destination under substantially identical circumstances," id. at 1259. Somehow,
the court was persuaded that rather than being due to the carriers' unjustly discriminating
between shippers, the rate disparity "was the result of a choice by the United States
Government ... to use different methods of dealing with the carriers depending on which
of its departments was doing the shipping .... " Id. at 1260. The Defense Department
both negotiated with the carriers and (later in time) took competitive bids; State merely
shipped at whatever rate the "conference" charged. The two American-flag carriers
convinced the court that it was the "conference" which fixed the rate, as they were but
two of 20 members of the conference "and since a vote of 2/3 is required to effect such a
change" in rates, efforts to lower the rate for the State Department would have been
futile. Id. One wonders how the court would have come out on this argument, if anyone
had bothered to tell it that the cargo in question was restricted to U.S.-flag carriers, that
all other members of the conference were foreign-flag lines, and that conference members
who have no interest in particular cargoes traditionally defer to their colleagues who do.
In any event, its opinion shows no inkling that the court really understood the situation.
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return to these and related problems after pausing now to study in
some detail the Boilers and NA UK results which very neatly illustrate
nearly all of the difficulties reviewed in the foregoing discussion.
(a) The results of the Boilers case. The subject of the Boilers in-
vestigation was the supposed competitive disadvantage to American
exporters of large utility-type boilers caused by higher freight rates
from the United States to India, Pakistan, Brazil, Argentina and the
Philippines than from ports in Europe and Japan to the same destina-
tions. We have reviewed above the Commission's findings that Amer-
ican exporters were not in fact injured by the rate disparities in question
and noted that despite these findings the Commission nonetheless ap-
plied the rate disparities rule and adjudicated the reasonableness of
the higher outbound United States rates.258 We shall look here in detail
at the Commission's grounds for holding that the carriers had ade-
quately "justified" the higher outbound American rates. The Commis-
sion accepted what were basically two justifications, higher costs in the
outbound American trades than in the outbound competitive trades
and differences in "attendant transportation circumstances," the major
one being competition.
(i) Cost. The carriers' cost justification was based on two factors:
the greater distance and voyage duration from American to Indian or
Pakistani ports and the fact that loading costs-and particularly heavy-
lift charges-were not included in the outbound rate from Continental
ports. First, we shall look at the distance justification. The evidence in
the Boilers record showed that rates from the United States to Calcutta
exceeded rates from Hamburg and the United Kingdom by 18.5 per
cent. Finding that "it is 27%0 further to Calcutta from the United States
than from the Continent and United Kingdom," the Commission con-
cluded that the higher United States outbound rate did not violate
either section 17 or section 18(b)(5) because, "[e]xpressed as a percentage
of the United States-Calcutta distance, the mileage difference is up-
wards of 21%/, compared with a rate difference of 18.5 %."259 Whether
the Commission meant to say that this mileage differential made the
triangular trades in question noncomparable or whether it furnished
in itself a satisfactory justification for higher outbound American rates
is unclear. Nevertheless, viewed either way, the result is the same, and
there is no doubt that the Commission bottomed its finding that sec-
tions 17 and 18(b)(5) were not violated on the increased cost to the
carriers in the United States/India-Pakistan trade imposed by the
greater distance and voyage duration from American than from Euro-
pean ports. In any event, in the recent case of C. H. Leavell & Co. v.
25S Text accompanying notes 184-91 supra.
259 9 F.M.C. at 448-9, 454-5.
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Hellenic Lines, Ltd.260 the Commission cites its Boilers decision for
the proposition that a steep 65 per cent surcharge on cargoes which had
to be rerouted around the Cape of Good Hope when the Suez Canal
was closed in June, 1967 was reasonable, since the voyage duration was
increased 164 per cent and the mileage distance 193 per cent. Accord-
ingly, at this point in time there can be no doubt that the Commission
intends to judge the reasonableness of given rate levels and surcharges
on the ground of their specific relation to differences in the carriers'
vessel voyage operating cost.
As regulatory policy, this aspect of the Commission's doctrine is
transparently erroneous. In both the Boilers and Leavell cases there
was no evidence introduced showing, respectively, the actual difference
in vessel voyage operating costs between the American and Continental
carriers in the India-Pakistan trade or the increase in these costs to
Hellenic Lines attributable to the lengthened voyage necessitated by
the closing of the Suez Canal. Only if there is some basis for relating
actual costs to the rates charged is it possible to determine whether a
given rate disparity is justified by a given cost difference or whether a
given surcharge level is justified by a given increase in carriers' costs.
For it is elementary that there is no direct relationship between vessel
operating costs and freight rate levels for particular items of cargo,
whether high-pressure utility-type boilers or shoelaces; value of service
and competitive considerations are far more influential in determining
rate levels on an item-by-item basis. The Commission itself recognized
this in the Boilers opinion, within a mere two pages of accepting the
carriers' distance justification, and thereby unwittingly demonstrated
that such total reliance on cost is misplaced. In the process of explain-
ing that Continental/Argentine rates were "depressed" (presumably by
competition) and therefore not fairly comparable with American/
Argentine rates, the Commission pointed to evidence that Continental
rates to Buenos Aires were 22 per cent less than Continental rates to
Rio de Janeiro, despite the fact that Buenos Aires is 1,000 miles farther
from Europe than Rio.26 '
Actually, there is a cause much more important than unequal dis-
tances for the sharp disparity in United States/India-Pakistan and
Continental/India-Pakistan liner freight rates which the Commission
ignored. The United States/India-Pakistan trade is a heavily govern-
ment-financed trade characterized by a preponderance of flag-reservation
cargoes-of which large, high-pressure boilers for use in huge govern-
ment-owned, foreign-aid financed, power plants are typical. The liner
260 F.M.C. Docket No. 68-14 (Oct. 1, 1969).
261 9 F.M.C. at 450.
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trade in these cargoes is the duopoly of the American-flag and Indian-
Pakistani lines; competition is nonexistent, and cargoes move at pre-
mium rates. By contrast, the trade between Europe and India-Pakistan
has none of these artificial restrictions on the shippers' choice of liner
services, nor is it as concentrated in market structure. The substantially
more competitive conditions characterizing the outbound European/
India-Pakistan trade cannot help but produce lower freight rates for
Continental exporters; and the fact that the Continental ports are
closer to Calcutta by 21 per cent (in nautical miles) is a purely for-
tuitous and irrelevant coincidence. The Commission's justification for
the 18.5 per cent higher rates from the United States to Calcutta on
the ground of greater nautical distance is therefore wholly unconvinc-
ing, if not entirely erroneous. Indeed, it may well be the case that the
national-flag carriers were abusing their dominant market position-
created chiefly by United States cargo preference laws--to extract mo-
nopoly rates from shippers; that the triangular rate disparities in
question were in fact illegal under sections 17 and 18(b)(5); and that
the Commission's holding was completely the reverse of what it should
have beenl
A similar difficulty afflicts the Commission's finding that the reason-
ableness of the differential between United States/Philippines and
Continental/Philippines rates could not be determined because of the
absence from the record of certain cargo-related costs, particularly
loading and heavy-lift charges. The outbound American rates were 41
per cent higher than the outbound Continental rates which, according
to the Commission, did not include the cost of loading, "which makes
up a substantial part of a carrier's tackle-to-tackle rates."26 2 On this
basis the Commission concluded that "no disparity on the ordinary
tariff rates to the Philippines has been shown because the Continent
to Philippine data are insufficient to make a probative comparison.1 263
Earlier, the Commission indicated that another rate disparity was some-
what less significant than it first appeared because "[t]here are substan-
tial heavy-lift charges in connection with boiler parts which are higher
from the Continent than from the United States. On the other hand,
U.S. loading costs are higher."-264 While the Commission made no
judgment based on this cost standard, the implication that it might
have, if the requisite data were present, can fairly be made. Moreover,
in its NA UK decision265 the Commission explicitly endorses reliance
262 Id.
263 Id. at 455.
264 Id. at 450 n.6.
265 NAUK Investigation at 32.
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upon the "out-of-pocket" costs related to cargo handling for the purpose
of "justifying" particular rate levels and invites such carrier defenses
in future proceedings. But, cargo-related costs provide no more reliable
standards by which to judge the reasonableness of liner rate levels than
do vessel voyage operating costs. Cargo-related costs establish only the
zero-profit limits of the carriers, that is, they provide only a floor for
liner rates. As such, they may be useful to the Commission in deciding
whether a rate is unreasonably low in violation of section 18(b)(5) 266
but this is the easiest question raised by that section and in no event
is it the question with which we are here concerned.
The truly difficult question, and the one raised by the Iron and Steel,
Boilers, and NA UK cases, is whether the amount of revenue which the
lines retain on the shipping transaction over and above direct cargo-
related costs is "reasonable" or better characterized as "monopoly
profits." For this, a great deal more information is needed. Looking at
differences in cargo-related costs as between trades only provides insight
into the zero-profit limits of one of the parties to the rate-making process
-the carriers. The Commission needs to know the differences in the
zero-profit limits of the shippers of the commodity being investigated,
as between the trades compared, before it can determine if the carriers'
retentions under the higher of the two disparate rates represented an
unreasonably high proportion of the total "profits pie" created by the
entire commercial transaction. For example, the landed price of boilers
in Latin America may be so far above the shipper's cost of production,
overland transport, and insurance, that the ocean carriers may justifiably
obtain a very high rate for their services, and still leave the shipper
with substantially higher profits than he would have earned had he sold
his boilers exclusively in the domestic market. Landed price competi-
tion between American and European boiler manufacturers, however,
in the Near East might be substantially greater, forcing down the range
between the price in the foreign and domestic markets. As a conse-
quence, in this case the zero-profit limits of the shipper and carrier
are much closer together and the freight rate must accordingly be lower
-leaving the carriers with smaller retentions on the transaction. Both
the United States/Latin American and United States/Near East rates
may be "reasonable" under section 18(b)(5), although one is very sub-
stantially above the cargo-related costs of the carriers and the other
is not. In this very plausible example, the rate disparity could neither be
condemned nor justified in terms of cargo-related costs.
An additional and equally serious objection to the use of cargo-related
266 However, total reliance upon out-of-pocket costs for this purpose is clearly mistaken.
See text accompanying notes 146-55 supra.
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costs is that the Commission may be faced with a situation in which the
carriers attempt to meet some of these costs by special assessments
against the cargo; for example, heavy-lift charges, which were especially
important in the Boilers case. It was considered significant that they
were reported to be higher from the Continent than from the United
States.267
Yet, unless the Commission subpoenas the actual heavy-lift costs
of the carriers, it cannot reach rational and accurate results if it ac-
cepts the heavy-lift charges as published as a fair reflection of the cost
of the service performed for a shipper. The following table sets out
the heavy-lift charges levied by 16 outbound conferences (counting
the Pacific Coast/India-Pakistan services provided by American Mail
Line and American President Lines as the equivalent of a "conference")
in the United States trades. (See table on following page.)
This comparison immediately demonstrates that the "extra weight"
of an item does not in itself determine anything about a rate. There is
no general rule governing when a heavy-lift charge will be assessed or
what the assessment will be. Not only is it true that the shippers and
carriers will negotiate whether or not any given extra charge will be
levied at all,268 but the amount of the charge itself is always open to
negotiation.2 69 And finally, as the table below indicates, there is
not even a consistent pattern in across-the-board charges as between the
conferences which sail out of the exact same ports with the exact same
loading cost structures. Thus, the North Atlantic Continental Freight
Conference imposes no heavy-lift charge at all on items weighing less
than 5 tons, whereas the other conferences do; and on an item weighing
50.1 long tons, the 16 conferences have nine different levies, reaching
from $94.88 to $3,793.04. Yet, there is obviously no cost justification
for these discrepancies. Most modern vessels are equipped to lift items
267 9 F.M.C. at 450 n.6.
268 Although the heavy-lift charges are stated in such a way that they appear to apply
to all items in a steamship tariff, this is rarely the case, since the minimum weight at
which the charge is imposed is normally high enough to exclude the most important
items of relatively heavy weight per unit which move steadily in the trade. But, in
addition, the tariffs often also exempt specific items from the heavy-lift charge; for
example: the entry for copper (anodes, bars, billets, cakes, cathodes, etc.) in the North
Atlantic United Kingdom Freight Conference Tariff (Item No. 2588, Tariff No. (46)
FMC-1) reads, "Heavy Lift Charges shall not apply on pieces weighing 6720 lbs. or less";
the entry for Airplanes and Parts, packed, Item No. 0091 contains the same language;
and the entry for Agricultural Implements, Item No. 0077-0084 in the same tariff,
contains similar wording excluding all pieces weighing less than 8960 lbs. (4 tons) from
the heavy-lift charges.
269 This, in fact, is the normal manner of proceeding in the case of all shipments of
very large or heavy items such as boilers, locomotives, power generators, presses, etc.
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weighing 10 to 20 tons; 270 and even if some additional lift equipment
is required for the heavier items, the discrepancies remain irrecon-
cilable on any cost basis.271
Any attempt to correlate heavy-lift charges with the cost of providing
the service is futile; the only correlation that makes any sense is one
based on the competition among the lines and conferences immediately
concerned. Where services are competitive, the heavy-lift charges are
identical; and on trade routes where there is substantial competition,
i.e., the North Atlantic Continental Europe and Mediterranean routes,
heavy-lift charges are lowest.
In summary, there are no cost factors whether relating to voyage
distance and duration or cargo handling costs, even when the latter
are broken out and separately assessed by the carriers in addition to
the published tariff rate, which correlate with rate levels with any
degree of reliability. Costs merely provide floors for rates, not ceilings.
A regulatory doctrine which permits a rate challenged as too high to
be justified or proven reasonable on grounds of carrier costs is inca-
pable of providing a sound policy of rate level regulation.
(ii) "Attendant transportation circumstances." Although the Con-
tinental outbound rate to Buenos Aires on boiler parts was 15.4 per
cent less than the United States outbound rate, there was no showing
"that these disparities have any tangible impact on the shipping
public. '272 On this ground, and because of differences in what it
characterized as "attendant transportation circumstances," the Commis-
sion pronounced itself satisfied that the higher United States outbound
rate did not violate section 17 or section 18(b)(5). The Commission's
reasoning is important for our purposes and thus is reproduced here
in full.
270 This is not to say that heavy items being lifted by a ship's own equipment do not
result in any extra costs; indeed they do. Longshore labor has dictated a variety of
restrictions on handling such items which severely limit productivity and thereby increase
costs. If the weights are such that booms must be "married," or "double purchase"
winches and falls must be rigged, the entire loading operation can be greatly slowed, and
if the loading of one or more hatches must be suspended in the process, with one or more
longshore gangs standing by drawing their hourly rate, the cost of this delay must be
attributed to the heavy-lift cargo. Moreover, as the stevedore bears all risk of damage and
loss to cargoes being loaded, he demands a higher rate for very heavy lifts, which
normally are comprised of high value cargo. Finally, heavy-lift equipment is costly and
an attempt is made to allocate at least a portion of its cost to the specific item being
lifted by it. All but the last item are, of course, out-of-pocket costs to the liner firm.
271 Since labor is a significant cost input both in loading and unloading, see note 270
supra, one might have thought that heavy-lift charges would be least where longshore
labor is cheapest. But, as the table shows, the reverse seems "to be the case; European
heavy lifts are the least and Asian the most expensive.
272 9 F.M.G. at 455.
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... [T]he Continental rates to Buenos Aires are depressed for
reasons having nothing to do with competition between U.S.
exporters and their foreign competitors. Although it is about
1,000 miles farther from Continental ports to Buenos Aires
than to Rio de Janeiro, the Continental rate on boiler parts
is $47.92 to Rio against $37.22 to Buenos Aires-$10.70 (22%)
less than the rate to Rio, a spread considerably greater than
the $6.78 (15.4%) spread between United States and Conti-
nental rates to Buenos Aires.
Apparently, the rates from the Continent to the River Plate
(which includes Buenos Aires) are traditionally lower than to
Brazil, because of the large volume of traffic and the fact that
return cargo is more plentiful than in the Brazil trade. Thus
competition for outbound cargoes [from the Continent] to the
River Plate depressed rates, while ships going to Brazil have to
continue on to the River Plate for return cargoes. 273
What the Commission apparently means is that there was much less
cargo moving outbound from the Continent to Argentina than there
was moving in the reciprocal direction, and this imbalance of trade
created substantial excess capacity on the outbound leg of the voyage,
generating a scramble for cargoes. Hence, even though there was prob-
ably a conference operating in the trade from Europe to the River
Plate, a subject on which the FMC made no findings, rate levels were
by any standard rather low. The trade to Brazil, however, was vastly
different. Here there was also an imbalance of cargoes, but in the
opposite direction. Vessels sailed from the Continent to Rio with sub-
stantial load factors, but were unable to obtain sufficient cargoes to
make the inbound leg profitable without going on to Buenos Aires.
The result was a strong conference in the Brazilian trade from the
Continent, with rates 22 per cent above those from the Continent to
Argentina, despite the fact that Argentina was 1,000 miles further
away from Europe. From this comparison with the Continent/Brazil
rates, the Commission evidently reasoned that the Continent/Argentina
rates are "depressed" by competition, and concluded either that "trans-
portation conditions" in the Continent/Argentina and United States/
Argentina trades were therefore not comparable "in material respects"
or that the higher United States rates were justifiable-unfortunately,
one cannot be quite sure of the precise ground of the Commission's
holding. But, read either way, the Commission's analysis demonstrates
that to use competitive differences as a standard for justifying rate
disparities either vitiates the Commission's regulatory doctrine-
273 Id. at 450.
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chiefly, the Iron and Steel rule-as a practical tool for implementing
sections 17 and 18(b)(5) of the Shipping Act, or raises very disquieting
issues which are irresolvable in the context of section 17 or section
18(b)(5) proceedings.
It would seem obvious that if there is any objective whatsoever to
be achieved by the prohibition of "unreasonably high" rates, it must be
the protection of American shippers from those carriers or conferences
which face no substantial competition-these being the only ones which
could extort from their customers rates which would either produce
monopoly profits or prevent cargo from moving-or both.27 4 Yet, under
the Commission's interpretation of section 18(b)(5) as applied via the
rate disparities rule to the American and Continental/Argentina trades,
that statute is a self-denying ordinance. The respondent carriers are not
merely permitted-they are invited-to establish the reasonableness of
their rates by showing that the trade with which their rates are com-
pared is more competitive; that is, that they-the respondents-face less
competition than do the carriers serving the reciprocal or triangular
trade in question. The underlying cause of or explanation for the
higher rate (the stronger market position of the conference in question)
has become in effect the justification for that ratel Thus, the statute
is vitiated.
But if, instead the Commission attempts to determine whether the
American outbound conference whose rate is higher than that in the re-
ciprocal or triangular trade is abusing its market power, the Commis-
sion's regulatory doctrine raises crippling problems which litigation
conducted according to its strictures cannot possibly resolve. This is
well illustrated by the portion of the Boilers opinion excerpted above,
where the Commission labeled the lower Continent/Argentina rates
"depressed," although there was nothing in the record to justify such
a description, or, much less, to suggest that these rates were unprofitable
to the Continental carriers. Since all prices for goods or services estab-
lished under more rather than less competitive conditions certainly
cannot be deemed "depressed," would it not have made as much sense
to label the United States/Argentina rates "inflated"? For if, in reg-
ulating freight rates under section 18(b)(5) on the strictly comparative
basis the Commission has chosen, it develops that the perceived dif-
ference in rates between two trades is due to a greater degree of com-
274 It seems beyond dispute that Senator Kefauver viewed his amendment, which later
became section 18(b)(5), as a prophylactic against abuse of monopoly power, rather than
as a proscription of monopoly power per se. 107 CONG. REc. 19430 (1961). Surely, only a
conference with an effective monopoly of liner service in a trade could prevent cargo
from moving in the sense referred to by Senator Kefauver and illustrated by his citation
of the several decisions of the FMC's predecessors, which he intended 18(b)(5) to codify. Id.
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petition in one than in the other, how is the Commission to know,
without looking at cost and revenue data, which rates are "inflated,"
"depressed," or simply "reasonable"? For the lines in the trade ex-
periencing greater competition may be suffering from rates below cost
-whether "out-of-pocket," or "direct" (fully distributed) costs are
relevant, is another question-or from rates otherwise providing an
insufficient return on capital; and shippers in the trade experiencing
less competition or none at all may be suffering under monopoly rates.
Other troublesome questions are suggested by the Commission's state-
ment that the Continental/Argentine rates are lower than American
rates "for reasons having nothing to do with competition between U.S.
exporters and their foreign competitors. 2 75 In the first place, one would
have thought that from this finding the Commission might have con-
cluded that the only other explanation for the lower Continental/
Argentine rate was that the trade was imperfectly cartelized; that is,
that the resident conference was weak. This might have suggested to
a perceptive Commission the extent to which the outbound American
conference was charging its shippers monopolistic or, at the least,
rather higher-than-competitive rates. In other words, the fact that the
Continental carriers were not engaged in a scheme to artificially depress
their rates in order to destroy American exporters and enlarge the mar-
ket for their own shippers, should have made their rates a more reliable
standard for measuring American outbound rates rather than a less
reliable onel Nevertheless, the Commission apparently reached the op-
posite conclusion.
In the second place, what could the Commission have done if it
had found that the Continent/Argentina rates were lower than the
American outbound rates for reasons having to do with competition
between United States exporters and their foreign competitors? In
view of the fact that carriers normally are motivated by a desire to help
their shippers compete in foreign markets, this is at least as realistic
a finding as that which the Commission actually made. What would
such a finding mean for the application of the rate disparities rule?
Would it now be easier for the Commission to conclude that the
trades were sufficiently comparable and that the higher American out-
bound rate was unjustified? Could the Commission reasonably require
the United States/Argentina carriers to meet those lower rates merely
because American exporters were suffering in competition with foreign
exporters? Certainly, no clear-cut answer appears in section 17 or sec-
tion 18(b)(5), and no answer whatsoever would seem supportable unless
275 9 F.M.C. at 450.
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we knew the return to the carriers on the rates which the Commission
will require them to charge.
These difficult questions, although drawn directly from the Com-
mission's language in the Boilers opinion, may not be attributed merely
to the inartful draftsmanship of its author(s). On the contrary, they
are unavoidable if the Commission persists in its view that sections 17
and 18(b)(5) can be meaningfully enforced by rate-level comparisons
alone.276 For competition-that is, the availability to shippers of non-
conference liner services, alternative modes of transport, and alternative
routes to destination-is a primary determinant of any given rate level.
Rate levels will always differ, even as between trades which have
similar voyage and cargo-related cost structures, and even as between
the same or similar commodities, to the precise extent that competition
differs between the reciprocal or triangular trades compared. A more
accurate statement of the same proposition is that rate disparities will
only appear between reciprocal or triangular trades when the confer-
ences differ in the extent to which they have effectively cartelized their
respective liner markets and when the shippers in each market differ
in the facility with which they can substitute alternative, competitive
services for the conference lines. Thus, if the carriers must "justify"
the higher of any two disparate rates in terms of "attendant transpor-
tation circumstances," and this phrase includes competitive conditions,
as it must, the difficulties suggested above appear. The Commission's
inability to obtain data relating to the overall profitability of the rates
in question, and its impotence to fix rates according to public utility
principles paralyzes it in a system which- explicitly legalizes cartels
and thus cannot be said to have outlawed all rates higher than com-
petitive conditions might dictate. Absent the appropriate data, the FMC
is unable to identify the excessive or abusive monopoly rate and to
distinguish it from that which Congress must be conceded to have
endorsed in sections 14b and 15 and permitted in section 18(b)(5). 277
Similarly, absent the power to fix rates based on reasonable levels of
profitability it has no effective criteria to apply to whatever data it
might obtain.
There is, finally, one nearly insuperable difficulty with using "atten-
276 There is no evidence of record of the reasonableness of the rates as measured
by the excess of revenue over costs of moving the cargo. Thus, the only probative
measure of the reasonableness of the rates must be based upon a consideration
of rate disparities, either triangular or reciprocal.
9 F.M.C. at 457.
277 Senator Kefauver failed to recognize this: "It [18(b)(5)] acknowledges that these
monopolies can set high rates-even unreasonably high rates. But, the rates must not
be so unreasonable as to be detrimental to the commerce of the United States." 107 CONG.
Rac. 19429 (1961). It is his last sentence which causes the problem.
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dant transportation circumstances," whether these are limited to com-
petitive conditions or broadened to include everything from famine
in India to the closing of the Suez Canal, as criteria for judging the
reasonableness of rate levels. While it is indeed possible to explain
the differences between two rates in different trades on the ground
of differences in transportation circumstances, it is impossible to reduce
these "circumstances" to numerical values, statistics or hard data, so
as to determine whether the particular disparity (10%, 20% or 50%)
is warranted by the difference in transportation circumstances. The im-
pact of competition cannot be quantified and its role cannot be eval-
uated outside the shipper-carrier and inter-carrier rate bargaining
process within which and upon which competition has its effects. More-
over, as the Supreme Court has recognized, "ratemaking is a continuous
process," 278 and nowhere is this more true than in ocean liner transport.
Competitive conditions are continuously changing not merely in the
particular ocean liner markets subject to the Commission's jurisdiction
but also in the several other markets for transport services not subject
to its jurisdiction. Even if numerical values could be assigned to specific
levels of competition and this data plugged into the record, there is
no reason to believe that during the one or two-year period during
which the section 17 or section 18(b)(5) proceeding is litigated, first
before the Commission and then in the courts, that transportation
circumstances will remain the same. This criticism is particularly apro-
pos if the Commission persists in applying section 18(b)(5) in the
context of comparative proceedings between trades. For the factors
referred to previously which account for all differences in rates on
similar cargoes, as well as such circumstances as whether the cargoes are
government or commercially financed and restricted or unrestricted by
cargo preference laws to certain national-flag vessels, are likely to be
constantly changing. It would be difficult enough for the Commission
to determine whether any one or more of these factors "justifies" a
given rate level, if they were all in static equilibrium; but when they
are in constant flux, the Commission's difficulties would appear to be
overwhelming.
(b) The results of the NA UK case. As we have seen, seven NAUK
Conference rates which were higher than their counterparts in three
other trades were disapproved on the ground that the Conference failed
to justify them in terms similar to those accepted in the Boilers case.
Three months after the Commission's final order,279 the Conference
278 Georgia v. Pennsylvania R.R. Co., 324 U.S. 439, 461 (1945).
279 The Commission's order was dated August 20, 1968, but its effectiveness was
stayed until November 25, 1968 to facilitate the Conference's appeal from the Commission's
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filed new rates accompanied by the written "justifications" which the
Commission required.28 0 Shortly thereafter, the FMC's Bureau of
Hearing Counsel filed its written comments on the Conference's jus-
tifications. 28s Since no further action has been taken during the ensuing
twelve months, the NA UK Investigation would appear finally to be
concluded.
In every respect, and for the same reasons, the NA UK results are as
unsatisfactory as those of the Boilers case. The Conference's justifica-
tions are as completely beyond principled evaluation as the rates them-
selves, given the dearth of information at the Commission's command,
and its statutory inability to look to the carriers' rate of return. Thus,
whether the rates are still unreasonable in terms of section 18(b)(5)-
if indeed they ever were-is an open question. Again, the essence of
the problem is that the Commission compared rates in a more effec-
tively cartelized trade with rates in one or more less effectively cartelized
trades and tried to force the former down to the level of the latter in
the absence both of clearly defined standards for doing so and of a
supporting rationale consistent with the statutory scheme of the Ship-
ping Act.
We shall look first, and briefly, at the marked differences in "trans-
portation conditions" as between the NAUK trade and those with
which it was compared. If the Commission meant seriously its reit-
erated assertions that the NA UK decision would be governed by the
precedent of the Iron and Steel and Boilers cases, it is clear that the
"transportation conditions" justification, had it been argued by the
NAUK Conference, would have been upheld. Again, as in the Boilers
case, the result would have been a vitiation of section 18(b)(5), and a
clear demonstration of the futility of the Commission's regulatory doc-
trine, in general, and of its rate disparities investigations, in particular.
Next, we shall examine the new rates and written justifications therefor
filed by the NAUK Conference to determine, if we can, whether the
NA UK results warrant the great public and private cost of achieving
them.
There can be no doubt that during the period under investigation
decision. On November 21, 1968 the Court of Appeals dissolved the stay so as to avoid
"any possible claim of mootness of the important issues presented by this appeal .... "
American Export-Isbrandtsen, Lines Inc. v. FMC, Docket No. 22,402 (D.C. Cir. 1969) (order
of November 21, 1968).
280 These justifications were conveyed by a letter from C. J. Moran, NAUK Conference
Chairman, to the Secretary, Federal Maritime Commission, Nov. 25, 1968 [hereinafter
cited as Conference Letter].
281 Letter from D. J. Brunner, Director, Bureau of Hearing Counsel to the Secretary,
Federal Maritime Commission, Dec. 6, 1968 [hereinafter cited as Bureau Letter].
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the North Atlantic United Kingdom outbound trade was more effec-
tively cartelized than either the Canada/United Kingdom and North
Atlantic Continental outbound trades or the United Kingdom/United
States inbound trade. Not only would every experienced shipper and
steamship operator active in the United States and Canadian North
Atlantic trades with Europe so testify, but there was conclusive evidence
to this effect spread across the hearing examiner's and the Commission's
NA UK decisions. The Commission found that the NAUK Conference
lines carried 98 per cent of all eastbound liner cargo in 1965 while the
NAWFA members carried only 94 per cent,2 2 and that, more signif-
icantly,
There are some special factors that tend to keep the NAWFA
rates down: the existence of very active trade associations in
the United Kingdom that negotiate with the conference, com-
petition from manufacturers on the Continent, ability of
shippers to transship via Continental ports (the rates from the
Continent to the United States being lower than those from
the United Kingdom), nonconference competition from the
United Kingdom and the Continent, conference competition
from the Continent, and carriers destined for the United
States Great Lakes and Gulf ports with cargo destined to mid-
west points283
In every respect mentioned in the foregoing excerpt, with the notable
exception of powerful shipper groups and trade associations which are
also present in the United States and which negotiate highly successfully
with the NAUK Conference, the NAUK carriers face significantly less
actual and potential competition. This conclusion is further buttressed
by the comparative capacity utilization figures compiled by the hearing
examiner for the years 1961-66. While showing an extraordinarily high
unused capacity for both conferences, they leave no doubt that the
NAWFA members were considerably worse off:
Percentage of Capacity Unused284
Conference 1961 1962 1963 1964 1965 1966
NANVFA 71.4 68.0 66.2 68.3 64.0 61.4
NAUK 61.0 62.8 65.2 61.4 57.7 53.0
These figures, of course, reflect a complex of underlying "transportation
conditions." Not only did the inbound NAWFA members make more
282 NAUK Investigation at 3-4.
283 Id. at 7.
284 Init. Dec., supra note 194, at 39.
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sailings per year 285 and offer a considerably greater carrying capacity
to the trade than their outbound NAUK Conference counterparts,2 6
but they also had to contend with a larger number of independent
liner and tramp sailings.57 Yet, for their relatively greater supply of
liner tonnage there was only a slightly greater quantity of cargo offer-
ings available for the NAWFA than for the NAUK Conference carriers
in three of the six years studied, once the bulk and military cargo
carryings of the NAUK Conference members are added to their com-
mercial, break-bulk liftings, 288 and in the remaining three years, 1964-67,
there was probably less cargo available for the inbound NAWFA
285
Number of Sailings
Conference 1961 1962 1963 1964 1965 1966
NAWFA 391 409 391 384 361 411
NAUK 319 321 327 372 311 383
Id.
286
Total Carrying Capacity in Measurement Tons (000's)
Conference 1961 1962 1963 1964 1965 1966
NAWFA 3,573 3,441 3,345 3,426 3,157 3,403
NAUK 2,790 2,680 2,696 2,983 2,579 3,117
Id.
287 Note 283 supra.
288 The hearing examiner excluded both bulk and military cargo carryings from the
measurement and weight tonnage lifted during the period 1961-66 by the NAUK
Conference carriers. Yet, bulk carryings comprised of grains, oils, and other bulk liquids,
and soy bean meal amounted to 34,601 out of a total of 404,569 weight tons or 8.5 per cent
of the total carryings by weight during 1965 of the NAUK Conference members. See
note 210 supra. Military cargo carryings, which move in the main on a measurement basis
and are largely restricted to U.S.-flag lines, occupied roughly 33-40 per cent of total cubic
capacity outbound of the American-flag members of the NAUK Conference during the
six years studied. Statistics are based on confidential data obtained from the carriers
and from interviews with carrier and conference officials. As a consequence, it may be
estimated that military cargo liftings comprised a minimum of approximately 10 per cent
of total Conference carryings on a measurement basis, in view of the substantial share of
Conference capacity operated under the American flag. This is a conservative estimate,
which much understates the impact of military cargoes during the 1961-63 period, but is
somewhat closer to reality for the period 1964-66. In sum, by excluding bulk and military
cargo carryings from the NAUK Conference statistics, the examiner understated actual
NAUK Conference carryings by a factor of approximately 18 per cent. This is very
significant since little or no bulk commodities or military cargoes move inbound from
the United Kingdom.
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lines.28 9 Clearly, the foregoing data could easily have justified a Com-
mission finding identical to that made in the Boilers case,290 that
transportation conditions in the trades served by the NAWFA and
NAUK Conference, respectively, were so different as to render their
rates not fairly comparable, or alternatively, that the lower inbound
rates were "depressed" by competition and thus, the higher outbound
rates were "justified." A similar analysis is appropriate with respect to
the North Atlantic Continental and Canada/United Kingdom trades.
As the conferences in these trades clearly faced greater competition
than the NAUK Conference in its trade and, accordingly, possessed
significantly smaller market shares, 291 the Commission could have and
should have found the Canadian and Continental trades not fairly
comparable with the NAUK trade in "transportation conditions," or,
alternatively, that higher rates were "justified" in the latter trade.
In sum, the rates on onions and meat offal, for example, were lower
in the trades compared than in the NAUK trade for the reason that
their shippers were better able to substitute the service of independent
lines for the service of the conferences in those trades than were
shippers of similar commodities in the NAUK trade. Similarly, the
rate on General Cargo, N.O.S.-which covers the cargo offerings of
perhaps hundreds of shippers and cannot possibly reflect the cost to
the carriers of lifting any particular cargo or the value of the service
to and relative demand elasticity of any one of the many shippers
289 In this regard, the preceding note should be read in the light of the following data:
Measurements Tons Carried (000's)
Conference 1961 1962 1963 1964 1965 1966
NANTFA 1,024 1,101 1,131 1,086 1,136 1,315
NAUK* 717 686 697 911 863 1,206
Weight Tons Carried (000's)
Conference 1961 1962 1963 1964 1965 1966
NAWFA 456 520 519 501 552 661
NAUK* 354 350 327 485 436 520
Does not include bulk or military cargo.
Init. Dec., supra note 194, at 39.
290 Text following note 273 supra.
291 The fierce competitive situation prevailing then and now in the Continental trade
is so well known as to require no citation of authority; relative to the Canadian/UK trade,
however, see CANADIAN RESrEICTIVE TRADE PRACtiCES COMMISSION, SHIPPING CONFERENCE
ARRANGEMENTS AND PRACTICES, A REPORT IN THE MATTER OF AN INQUIRY UNDER THE COMBINES
INVESTIGATION ACT IN CONNECTION WFTH THE TRANSPORTATION OF COMMODITIES BY WATER
FROM AND TO PORTS IN EASTERN CANADA 36-40 (1965).
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concerned-was lower in the inbound NAWFA tariff precisely because
that conference feared that a higher rate would divert significant
carryings to the independent lines. This pressure of existing and poten-
tial competition also explains why the NAWFA General Cargo, N.O.S.
rate covered a smaller number of commodities than its NAUK counter-
part, the NAWFA tariff being very much more differentiated with
nearly 1,000 more tariff entries than the NAUK tariff.2912 The greater
the elasticity of demand on the part of shippers, even those controlling
small volumes of cargo, the more likely it is that the carriers will have
to move away from the General Cargo, N.O.S. rate, with its disregard
for the specific characteristics and demand elasticities of particular
shippers, toward more personalized classifications and rates tailored to
individual differences in bargaining power.
An impressive case can be made then, that the NA UK Investigation
should have resulted in a set of findings that section 18(b)(5) had not
been violated because the justifications made out in the Boilers case
with respect to the Brazilian and Argentinean rates there in question
had been established here as well. This was not the outcome of the
investigation, however, because the NAUK Conference did not make
this defense. It stressed the foregoing differences in value of service and
transportation circumstances not to justify its higher rates, but to deny,
in limine, the propriety of rate comparisons under the Iron and Steel
rule. As both the hearing examiner and the full Commission were
determined to hold the trades fully comparable, irrespective of the
facts, 293 the conference's strategy was an obvious failure. Yet, having
adopted it, a reintroduction of the same evidence for the purpose of
establishing "rate justifications," was either considered unnecessary or
futile. In any event, the NAUK Conference's defeat was hardly in-
evitable and seems to have been due, ironically, to a failure fully to
appreciate the toothlessness of the Commission's regulatory doctrine.
Nevertheless, having lost its battles before the Commission and the
courts, the NAUK Conference by no means lost the war. The rates
disapproved covered a trivial amount of tonnage and the new rates
filed have surely had a minute impact on its revenues. More important
for our purposes, however, are the rate justifications which the NAUK
Conference finally filed in conjunction with its new, lower rate levels.
Nothing better demonstrates the futility of the Commission's regulatory
doctrine than these "justifications."
(i) General Cargo, N.O.S. The NAUK Conference complied with
292 Init. Dec., supra note 194, at 33. There were 2,730 commodity classifications in the
NAWFA tariff and only 1,650 in that of the NAUK Conference.
293 See notes 226-9 supra and accompanying text.
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the Commission's order to file a new General Cargo, N.O.S. rate by
replacing its formerly unitary $70.75 W/M rate with a scale of four
rates based upon value as set forth in the margin.294 Of these only the
first two were lower than the previous rate, the first by $26.75 and the
second by $4.75. The latter two rates are considerably higher.295 The
Conference justified its new rate schedule with the following reasoning:
since the General Cargo, N.O.S. rate covers so many and widely varying
types of cargo, it cannot reflect cost of service or value of service
factors; accordingly, no "justification" may be based on such considera-
tions. Nor did the Conference attempt a justification based on "other
transportation conditions." All it would say was that:
So far as "other transportation conditions" are concerned, this
Conference points out that its General Cargo rates are sub-
stantially lower than those of other conferences serving the
eastbound trade to Europe. The new rate scales are in some
instances lower and in others higher than those of the inbound
conference with which they have been compared but fairly
meet the points made by the Commission. The Conference
Lines do consider that the new scale of rates may bring them
more closely into accord with the value of these unknown-
and unknowable-goods, but only future experience can pro-
vide an assurance of this.2 6
The Bureau of Hearing Counsel made no comment on the Conference's
"justifications," that is, other than taking credit for the change ("This
is in accord with our recommendations in this proceeding."), and ac-
knowledging that it was impossible to evaluate the impact of this
change until data had been accumulated regarding cargo movement
under the new rate levels.297
There are three damning features of the foregoing exercise. First,
we are unlikely ever to know with certainty whether the Conference's
294 The new General Cargo, N.O.S. rates effective September 10, 1968 were as follows:
Value per ton WIM Rate* Item No.**
Up to $500 $44 W/M 3762
$500 to $1,000 $66 W/M 3763
$1,000 to $2,000 $83 W/M 3764
$2,000 to $5,000 $99 W/M 3765
Over $5,000 2% Ad Valorem 3766
* This is the contract rate, and is approximately 15% less than the non-contract rate.
' North Atlantic United Kingdom Freight Conference Tariff No. (46) F.M.C.-1.
205 As of July 28, 1969, two of the General Cargo rates, those for cargo valued up to
$500 per ton and $1,000 to $2,000 per ton have been raised by $5.25 and $6, respectively.
296 Conference Letter at 2-3.
297 Bureau Letter at 1.
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rate decrease had any impact on cargo movement. Second, the NAUK
Conference's "justification," based as it is on rate comparisons, is as
meaningless, if not more so, than the Commission's original rationaliza-
tion for holding the $70.75 N.O.S. rate unreasonably high. Third,
the rate decrease might even be harmful. Surely, if any one of these
observations is correct, the Commission ought to be declared bankrupt
under section 18(b)(5).
First, it is clear that both the Conference and the Bureau of Hearing
Counsel are correct in declining to speculate regarding the effect of
the new rates; experience alone can tell. Nevertheless, it is highly
questionable whether, after the data is in, there will be a sound basis
for confidence that anything of significance has been accomplished.
For the essence of the General Cargo rate is that the cargoes which move
under it are truly "unknown and unknowable" until the event, and
once they come to the attention of the carriers, they rarely continue
to remain rated as "General Cargo, N.O.S." unless the carriers are
convinced that the movement of the goods is unlikely to be price elastic.
If they are correct-and there are certainly no a priori reasons or
empirical evidence to warrant our doubting it, and much, on the
contrary, to confirm our faith291---then the great majority of the Con-
ference's General Cargo, N.O.S. carryings are unlikely to increase in
volume in response to the NAUK Conference's rate cuts. If this is
true, we shall never know the value of the exercise, and more important,
the carriers will merely lose revenues to no end-but more on the latter
point below.
Second, it is noteworthy that the Conference interpreted "other trans-
portation conditions" to refer to rates in other trades and not to
competitive circumstances, throwing back to the Commission, as a
ground for "justification," the same rate comparisons upon which the
Commission originally found the $70.75 rate to be in violation of
section 18(b)(5). But if the General Cargo, N.O.S. rate "bears no rela-
tionship to the cost of the service or the value of the service, because
it is applicable to a widely varying type of cargo; that is, any cargo
for which a specific commodity rate cannot be found in the tariff,
299
then the General Cargo, N.O.S. rate is strictly arbitrary in every
tariff and every trade and no one General Cargo rate may be shown
to be less or more reasonable than another merely by a process of
comparison. Thus, there was no basis whatsoever upon which the FMC
could conclude that the higher NAUK General Cargo rate was un-
reasonably high merely because it was higher than the NAWFA
298 See note 218 supra.
299 NAUK Investigation at 16.
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General Cargo rate. But this was what the Commission did, and if
"turnabout is fair play," it is fitting that the Conference was per-
mitted to "justify" its new rates on the basis of the same meaningless
rate comparisons used by the Commission. Presumably, because two
of its four General Cargo rates are now lower than the NAWFA rate,
they are now "reasonable"!
Finally, there is as much reason to believe that lowering two of the
four new General Cargo, N.O.S. rates below the old $70.75 level may
do as much harm to American exporters and the carriers as good.
We begin with the proposition that the only cargoes which move under
General Cargo, N.O.S. rates are those for which the relatively high rate
level is of no significance in the landed price competition in the
market of destination; those which possess very little elasticity of
demand for ocean transport services; or those which are routed by
shippers who are too inexperienced or ignorant to know that it is
possible for them to negotiate lower rates from the conference, if they
can make a case that lower rates will increase their consignments to
the trade. The high ratio of successful to unsuccessful applications to
the NAUK Conference for lower rate levels30 and the proliferation of
rating classifications in the NAUK Conference Tariff under which
very small volumes of cargo move annually301 together suggest that
the very great majority of shippers under the General Cargo rubric
belong in the first two categories described. As a consequence it is
very unlikely that the Conference will have increased its revenues by
cutting its General Cargo, N.O.S. rates approximately $26 per ton
W/M for cargoes valued under $500 per ton, and $4.75 per ton W/M
for cargoes valued from $500-$1,000 per ton. These rate cuts may
stimulate some additional business, if by chance some of the cargoes
affected are highly price elastic in the English market, but it is doubtful
that the Conference will make up in greater volume all of the revenue
which it loses by its lower per ton rates. In any event, it is certain
that the highly priced elastic commodities would have sooner or later
been recognized and given lower-rated classifications. If this analysis
is correct, then the Commission has coerced the Conference into an
300 See note 298 supra.
301 The examiner found that although there were 1650 entries in the NAUK Conference
tariff in 1965, "three quarters of the tonnage carried by the NAUK vessels that year was
transported under just 116 of these tariff rates." Init. Dec., supra note 194, at 29-30. It
should be noted that after the top 116 items, volume drops off very steeply and rather
small shippers are involved. For example, the 200th commodity carried in terms of weight
tons, item 6951, grapes, moved in a volume of only 305 tons in 1965. See note 210 supra.
Finally, the cargo statistics distributed by the Conference office to the member lines on a
quarterly and annual basis show that there are several hundred tariff entries under which
considerably less than 75 tons moves in any given year.
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outright loss of revenue which is essential and is, in fact, used to
subsidize the carriage of commodities which do not cover their fully
distributed costs either because their very low value increases the
chances that, if made to pay higher rates they will be uncompetitive
in the English market, or because their shippers possess a very high
elasticity of demand for shipping service. In this sense there has been
a violation of the basic principle of value of service ratemaking, and
if sufficient revenues are in fact diverted in this manner, rates for
other cargoes might have to be raised to the detriment of the shippers
and the carriers, too. In any case, no one knows at present what the
result will be, and it is unlikely that anyone ever will. The uncertainty
which inheres in this outcome and the absence of any rational way
to evaluate it would suggest that the game is surely not worth the
candle.
(ii) The six commodity rates. The Conference filed new rates
for egg albumen, meat offal, onions, plastic sheeting, and toys, 0 2
which were lower than the rates disapproved by $4.50, $4.00, $1.00,
$21.25 and $5.00 per ton, respectively. In no case did it offer a rate
justification based on cost, value of service or transportation conditions;
but, rather, in each instance urged the Commission to accept the new
level in question because it narrowed the rate disparity upon which
the Commission had based its finding that the old NAUK Conference
rate in question was unreasonably high. Thus, the new egg albumen
rate, for example, lowered the gap between NAUK and North Atlantic
Continental rates to cent per pound on a weight basis or to .3 cents
per pound on the measurement basis upon which egg albumen is
actually freighted, and the new meat offal rate, in conjunction with
an increase in the North Atlantic Continental rate, lowered the dis-
parity between the former and the latter to $2.25 per ton on a weight
basis. In the case of onions, too, the principal NAUK Conference
justification was that the Canadian/United Kingdom Conference rate
had been substantially increased after the NAUK proceedings ended
and thus only a small rate adjustment ($1.00 per ton) was required to
decrease the disparity which bothered the Commission to a mere $1.25
per ton. In the case of two of the commodities, plastic sheeting and
egg albumen, the justification for the modified rates also contained a
302 The sixth commodity, sleds, was not given a new rate, but rather was included in
the toy rate. The rate for sleds which the Commission had disapproved was the $70.75
General Cargo rate, which the Conference stubbornly maintained it had never intended
to charge for sleds in the first place-the sleds rate having been deleted through a mis-
understanding. Accordingly, a cross-reference was inserted in the tariff to make it clear
that sleds was now induded within toys. Consequently, we shall exclude the sleds rate
from all future discussion. Conference Letter at 2, 4.
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statement to the effect that decreasing the rate disparities in question
"should suffice to remove any impediment to the movement" of goods. 03
The Bureau of Hearing Counsel had little to say regarding these jus-
tifications. In the case of meat offal, toys, sleds, and plastic sheeting,
it reported that all of the shippers which the Bureau contacted were
happy with the Conference's rate reductions. With respect to egg
albumen, the Bureau expressed a willingness to disregard the fact
that the modified NAUK rate remained higher than the Continental
rate on the ground that "there is some indication in the record that
the Continental rate may be depressed."304
Its only quarrel with the Conference came with respect to its rate
reduction on onions of only $1.00 per ton, which left a disparity be-
tween the NAUK and Canadian/United Kingdom rates of $4.23 rather
than the $1.25 calculated by the Conference, the Canadian dollar being
worth only $0.92 U.S. on the date of the Bureau's comments. The
Conference had justified its higher rate on the grounds that (1) the
higher NAUK rate was obviously of no consequence to the competitive
position of the onion exporters, since Canadian shippers "unable to
find suitable space at Canadian ports, are currently trucking onions to
New York for shipment to the United Kingdom"; and (2) the new rate,
which worked out to only $13.17 per measurement ton (the freighting
basis), was "too low for any perishable commodity. ' 35 To these argu-
ments the Bureau replied (1) that the Canadian shippers were routing
through New York because the St. Lawrence River ports were closed
for the winter and suitable space was not available at Canadian ports;
and (2) that the Canadian rate was even lower on a measurement basis
($10.71 per ton) and "[f]urthermore, whereas NAUK complains about
having to charge only $13.17 to onion shippers, it maintains tobacco
rates of $11 and $13.50 per measurement ton."30 6 In any event, the
Bureau declined to make an issue over the new onion rate because the
onion shippers contacted did not request further action.
The Conference's justifications and the Bureau's comments thereon
offer no basis for confidence that the NA UK Investigation constitutes a
worthwhile regulatory accomplishment. Surely, nothing the Conference
said establishes the reasonableness of its new rate levels. The problem is,
of course, the same as that which we have already discussed: rate compar-
isons can by themselves neither justify nor condemn rate levels. It is
impossible to "justify" charging higher rates because one has more
303 Conference Letter at 3-4.
304 Bureau Letter at 1.
805 Conference Letter at 4.
806 Bureau Letter at 2.
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monopoly power than other sellers of similar services who are forced
to charge lower rates because their markets are less-effectively cartelized.
But, as we have seen, any other excuse or "justification" for the NAUK
Conference's higher rates is specious. A more effective cartel is its own
justification in a system in which cartels are the proper and legal orga-
nization of the industry! Thus, when the Bureau of Hearing Counsel
accepted the higher NAUK rate for egg albumen on the ground that
there was evidence that the North Atlantic Continental rate with which
it was compared "may be depressed"-presumably by competition-the
Bureau was unintentionally admitting the bankruptcy of the regulatory
doctrine to which it is wedded. For this rationale can "justify" not
merely the NAUK egg albumen rates, but all its other rates as well.
In any event, the willingness of the Bureau Counsel to drop the matter
solely because the shippers of the commodities in question were happy
with the Conference's rate reductions exposes the very great degree to
which the entire NA UK proceedings were dependent upon individual
shipper complaints rather than any objective standards of rate evalua-
tion.
Finally, the Bureau and the Commission do not come off very well
in the former's exchange with the Conference regarding the disparity
between NAUK and Canada/United Kingdom onion rates. On the
contrary, the exchange confirms our doubts that the Commission ever
had any substantial grounds for finding the original onion rate, which
it disapproved, unreasonably high. In actual fact, both the old rate,
which worked out to approximately $14 per measurement ton, and the
new rate of $13.17 per measurement ton are very low rates which can-
not possibly cover the fully distributed costs of the shipping services
which the onion exporters are obtaining. It is likely that both rates
leave only a very small margin over the carriers' cargo-related costs,
if anything at all. The old rate was as low as $14 because of the signifi-
cant bargaining power of the onion exporters, onions being the 8th
most important commodity lifted by the carriers.30 7 The onion ex-
porters and the Conference have a long history of hard bargaining in
which the considerable elasticity of demand of the shippers had forced
down the rate to an extraordinarily low level. At all times, in fact,
the American onion exporters had utilized a bargaining strategy which
whipsawed the NAUK Conference with the lower rates available to
their Canadian competitors and to some of their number who routed
their cargoes through Canada. Altogether, it may fairly be said that the
307 Ranking derived from the Conference's Hearings exhibit note 210 supra.
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onion exporters had squeezed from the Conference the maximum con-
cessions which they could possibly have obtained on their own, and to
suggest that the Conference had violated section 18(b)(5) by failing to
concede even more, is obviously absurd. Nevertheless, this is the effect
of the Commission's disapproval of the old onion rate. The new rate,
amounting to $13.17 per measurement ton, will only require that the
onion exporters be further subsidized by other shippers who are
presently paying rates above their fully distributed costs-that is, by
shippers possessing less bargaining power. For the Bureau of Hearing
Counsel to argue that the NAUK Conference should now be estopped
to complain about the low onion rate into which the Commission has
coerced it, because the Conference maintains even lower rates for
tobacco, indicates the full measure of the Bureau's failure to under-
stand the dynamics of the rate-making process. For the NAUK tobacco
rates are also unusually low and border closely on being unremunera-
tive; they, too, certainly fail to cover the carriers' fully distributed costs.
Yet, with respect to these rates, as with onions, the NAUK Conference
has no choice whatsoever. Tobacco is the second most important com-
modity in tonnage and the leading commodity in revenue carried by
the Conference and its shippers have the strongest bargaining power
of any shippers in the North Atlantic trades because they possess the
highest elasticity of demand for Conference services. To charge tobacco
more is to lose it entirely. Accordingly, to argue that an unusually low
rate such as onions is still unreasonably high in violation of section 18
(b)(5), as the Bureau did in its letter, because that rate remains higher
than another unusually low rate is ludicrous.
In sum, the results of the NA UK Investigation are very discouraging.
They carry to a logical extreme the full potential of the Commission's
Iron and Steel, or rate disparities, rule with all its disabilities. The out-
come of the NA UK Investigation, like that of the Boilers case, illumi-
nates the full dimensions of the Commission's failure to come to grips
with the fundamental problems of regulating the rates of one cartel
exclusively by reference to the rates of another, absent the power to
look to the carriers' rate of return. It has relied upon little more than
burden of proof manipulation and the self-serving testimony of wit-
nesses who care little about the broader questions of public policy
involved and seek only to maximize their own profits. By itself, this
would not constitute a significant departure from the normal practice
of most regulatory agencies, but, in view of the fact that the Commis-
sion has failed to develop any substantive standards by which it can
evaluate the great mass of evidence which its prolific investigations
1970]
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have generated, the quality of the Commission's regulatory product is
unlikely ever to rise above the very low level reached in NA UK and
Boilers.
This is not to say that no regulation of steamship conference rate
making is possible or desirable; the conclusion we urge is only that no
further broad-scale direct rate regulation be pursued. In terms of rates
actually lowered, the costs of the Commission's proceedings far exceed
their benefits, and in terms of the regulatory doctrine developed and
the results which this doctrine has thus far produced, the entire exercise
has been an intellectual debacle. Absent the power to fix rates based
upon public utility ratemaking principles, there is no hope that the
Commission can pour meaningful content into sections 17 and 18(b)(5).
Indeed, if ever effectively enforced, these sections would inevitably
conflict on the most fundamental level with sections 14b and 15. The
latter create a carefully articulated statutory scheme relying upon the
private rate negotiations which' have always characterized the price-
setting behavior of this industry, while conditioning the bargaining
strengths and weaknesses of the shippers and carriers vis-4t-vis each other.
Our contention is that, to the extent that the FMC or some other agency
effectively enforces sections 14b and 15, steamship conference ratemak-
bag may be beneficially controlled in the interest of the United States
shippers for whose protection the Shipping Act was originally promul-
gated;30 8 nothing further is required.
308 In the next section of the chapter upon which this paper is based, we deal in depth
with the manner in which and the reasons why indirect rate regulation is fully capable of
accomplishing the objectives which the Commission and its critics have long sought to
achieve. Among other things, we point out that most of the impact of sections 14, 14b, and
15 is latent, some of the provisions of these sections are mutually inconsistent and counter-
productive, and most of the force of these sections has been neglected or dissipated. In
addition, we question whether an independent regulatory agency, such as the FMC, is
required to enforce them. Unfortunately, these topics are too lengthy to be discussed in
the present article.
